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ABSTRACT 
 
Grounded cognition accounts of semantic representation posit that brain regions traditionally linked 
to perception and action play a role in grounding the semantic content of words and sentences. 
Sensory-motor systems are thought to support partially abstract simulations through which 
conceptual content is grounded. However, which details of sensory-motor experience are included 
in, or excluded from these simulations, is not well understood. We investigated whether sensory-
motor brain regions are differentially involved depending on the speed of actions described in a 
sentence. We addressed this issue by examining the neural signature of relatively fast (The old lady 
scurried across the road) and slow (The old lady strolled across the road) action sentences. The 
results showed that sentences that implied fast motion modulated activity within the right posterior 
superior temporal sulcus and the angular and middle occipital gyri, areas associated with biological 
motion and action perception. Sentences that implied slow motion resulted in greater signal within 
the right primary motor cortex and anterior inferior parietal lobule, areas associated with action 
execution and planning. These results suggest that the speed of described motion influences 
representational content and modulates the nature of conceptual grounding. Fast motion events are 
represented more visually whereas motor regions play a greater role in representing conceptual 
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Introduction 
Recent theories of human cognition argue for a tight coupling between perceptual and 
representational systems. Proposals differ from each other in the exact role they ascribe to 
perceptual and motor brain regions in conceptual representation (for a review see: Meteyard, 
Cuadrado, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2012), but they all share the notion that sensorimotor experiences 
subserve cognition. On this view, experiential traces stored in sensorimotor brain regions can 
provide a means for grounding lexical-semantic content (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg, 1997; 
Pulvermüller, 1999).  
 Several lines of evidence support the grounded cognition view. Behavioral studies have 
provided evidence that language comprehension shares computational processes with perception 
and action (for reviews see Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan & Kaschak, 2008). Similarly, 
neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that language comprehension involves the 
recruitment of sensory-motor brain regions. Several studies have shown that the comprehension of 
action verbs (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Kemmerer, Castillo, Talavage, Patterson, & 
Wiley, 2008; Van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010), action sentences (Tettamanti et al., 
2005; Desai et al., 2009, 2011, 2013; Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006) and words 
denoting manipulable objects (Saccuman et al., 2006; Chao & Martin, 2000; Rueschemeyer, Rooij, 
Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010) reliably activate the cerebral motor system. In a similar 
vein, neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that comprehension of words semantically 
related to color (Simmons et al., 2007; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995), odor 
(Gonzalez et al., 2006) and audition (Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008), draw on 
brain regions relevant for coding corresponding modalities (see Binder and Desai 2011 for a 
review).  
A number of studies on patients with motor impairments corroborate these findings. In two 
studies with Parkinson’s patients, Fernandino and colleagues (2012, 2013) showed that patients (in 
contrast to controls) were selectively impaired in automatic and controlled processing of action 
verbs and sentences. Neininger and Pulvermüller (2003) showed that patients with predominant 
right frontal lesions were impaired in processing of action verbs, whereas patients with right 
temporo-occipital lesions showed impairments in processing nouns with strong visual associations. 
Trumpp and colleagues (2013) showed that damage to the left auditory association cortex led to 
selective impairments in the processing of sound-related concepts (e.g., “bell”). Bonner & 
Grossman (2012) demonstrated that reduced gray matter density in patients with auditory 
association cortex atrophy was correlated with the severity of their deficit in processing sound-
related words. Desai et al. (2015) showed that the degree of selective impairment in comprehension 
accuracy of action-related words was predicted by the degree of impairment in reaching 
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performance in a group of chronic stroke patients. These findings provide strong evidence for a role 
of sensory-motor brain regions in language comprehension. 
Despite the fact that numerous studies have reported sensory-motor activations in 
conjunction with language, the exact nature of these activations remains unclear. Activation that 
was specific to the semantic category presented has been documented as early as ~200 milliseconds 
after word onset (Pulvermüller, Härle & Hummel, 2000; Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004), when 
subjects did not attend to a word (Pulvermüller & Shtyrov, 2006; Shtyrov, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 
2004) and for action verbs embedded within abstract sentences (Boulenger et al., 2009). These 
findings have been taken to support the notion that embodied lexical-semantic effects are automatic 
and invariant. Recent studies, however, have provided evidence that the overlap observed in 
modality-specific sensory-motor processing and conceptual processing depends on contextual 
constraints (Van Dam et al., 2012; Hoenig et al., 2008; Kalénine et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2013; Yee 
& Thompson-Schill, 2016). The interaction between modality-specific sensory-motor regions and 
conceptual areas might even be more intricate. It is generally assumed that overlap in the 
computational mechanisms that underlie conceptual and sensory-motor processing reflect bottom-
up sensory-motor effects on higher-order cognition. However, factors like language-mediated 
categories can constrain sensory perception (Brouwer & Heeger, 2013; Puri, Wojciulik, & 
Ranganath, 2009; Lee & Noppeney, 2014), suggesting that shared computational processes might 
partially reflect top-down effects of linguistic priors on perception (Simanova, Francken, de Lange 
& Bekkering, 2016).   
Another crucial issue in theories of embodiment concerns the precise nature of conceptual 
grounding. Which details of sensory-motor experience are included in, or excluded from these 
simulations? Several studies have provided evidence that the sensory-motor information activated 
during language comprehension is fairly specific in nature. Mental simulations seem to encode 
effector-specific information (Scorolli & Borghi, 2007; Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004), the 
amount of detail in which movement kinematics are specified by a verb (e.g., to wipe vs. to clean: 
Van Dam, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2010), the directionality of the action an object affords 
(Rueschemeyer, Pfeiffer & Bekkering, 2010; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), implied orientation of an 
object (Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002), part of the visual field where a described scene would 
take place (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003; Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock & 
Narayanan, 2007) and direction of motion (Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley & Aveyard, 2004). For 
example, Zwaan and colleagues (2004) had participants decide whether two sequentially presented 
visual objects were identical or not, while concurrently listening to sentences that implied a 
movement in a certain direction. Crucially, either the first or second object would be depicted larger 
and therefore suggesting motion of the object towards or away from the observer. Participants were 
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faster to respond if the direction of the movement implied by the sentence matched the direction 
suggested by the sequence in which the two pictures were presented. These findings provide 
evidence that language-induced perceptual and motor simulations contain at least some details 
about objects and the actions they afford.  
 The abovementioned demonstrations of strong overlap in the computational mechanisms 
that underlie conceptual and sensory-motor processing lay at the core of any grounded cognition 
account. There has also been acknowledgment of the necessity of some degree of abstraction away 
from sensory-motor processes (Binder, 2016; Barsalou, 2016; Binder & Desai, 2011), and concepts 
are therefore not entirely reducible to modality-specific sensory or motor representations. In order 
for a grounded cognition account to be successful and move forward, it is important to detail in 
which exact ways sensory and motor representations contribute to language processing. Interesting 
open questions are: How extensive is the overlap in neural pathways involved in modality-specific 
sensory-motor processing and conceptual processing? Is detailed information incorporated more 
from certain sensory-motor modalities than others during language-induced simulations? 
 The role that abstraction away from detailed sensory-motor information plays in sensory-
motor grounding can provide us with viable insights in this regard. The mechanism of abstraction 
might be able explain why in many instances conceptual processing is similar to but does not equate 
with sensory-motor processing. Hsu and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that the extent to which 
primary perceptual regions were activated in a color judgment task depended on the degree of 
perceptual resolution needed by the task. If the task context required retrieval of detailed color 
knowledge the neural response was highly similar to that observed in color perception, the response 
in color perception regions was significantly reduced if the task could be accomplished on the basis 
of categorical (abstracted) knowledge. On the basis of these types of findings, several authors have 
proposed that conceptual knowledge may be represented at multiple levels of abstraction (Binder & 
Desai, 2011; Thompson-Schill, 2003). In this view, conceptual processing draws heavily on 
association areas involved in integration and abstraction in addition to utilizing sensory-motor 
representations to flesh out particular concepts (Binder 2016; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). As 
detailed above, task and linguistic context are likely important factors in determining the extent to 
which sensory-motor processes are recruited during conceptual processing, and therefore the extent 
to which representations and simulations mirror objects, actions and events in the real world (see 
also Van Dam et al., 2012; Hoenig et al., 2008 on the related topic of conceptual flexibility). 
 An interesting topic in this regard is (1) whether a relatively fine-grained parameter of an 
action like movement speed is incorporated in language-induced perceptual and motor simulations, 
and if so, (2) what exact information is activated. Behavioral studies have provided ample evidence 
that mental simulations during language processing are affected by the motion dynamics of the 
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motor experiences on which they are based. Meteyard and colleagues (2007), for example, showed 
that listening to verbs that denoted upward or downward motion affected perceptual sensitivity to 
motion, performance in a motion-detection task and subject’s internal decision criteria. Futhermore, 
recent behavioral studies have indicated mental simulations for speed during language processing. 
In a recent study, Speed and Vigliocco (2014) had participants listen to sentences describing fast 
and slow actions (e.g., The lion dashed to the balloon vs. The lion ambled to the balloon). They 
found that participants showed slower eye movements and longer looking times towards a 
concurrent visual scene while listening to slow actions as compared to fast actions. Lindsay and 
colleagues (2013) presented participants with sentences while concurrently looking at a scene 
depicting an agent and a path that led to a goal object. Subjects looked more often and longer along 
the path to the goal if the verb implied a slow manner of motion (e.g., to dawdle), whereas they 
looked earlier at the goal and less along the path if the verb implied a fast manner of motion (e.g., to 
dash). These findings suggest that speed-of-motion parameters are incorporated in mental 
simulations during language comprehension (see also Matlock, 2004). 
 While no neuroimaging studies have examined the simulation of speed of motion, there is 
strong neuroimaging evidence that sensory-motor simulations in language comprehension capture 
motion-related aspects of meaning, there is strong neuroimaging evidence that sensory-motor 
simulations in language comprehension capture motion-related aspects of meaning (Saygin et al., 
2010; Humphreys et al., 2013). Several studies have demonstrated involvement of area MT/V5 in 
processing motion-related language (Saygin et al., 2010; Rueschemeyer et al., 2010), a region that 
has shown to be critically involved in low-level motion perception (Beauchamp et al., 2002; 
Dumoulin et al., 2000; Tootell et al., 1995). Other studies have found that motion-related language 
activates regions within the posterior STS/pMTG (Kable et al., 2002, 2005; Bedny et al., 2008; 
Humphreys et al., 2013). These more posterior regions might not be as critical for processing of 
form and motion in general, but play a more specific role in the processing of biological motion 
(Vaina & Gross, 2004; Humphreys et al., 2013; Grossman, Batelli, & Pascual-Leone, 2005).  
 The amount of detail with which speed-of-motion parameters are incorporated in and the 
sensory-motor regions involved in these simulations remains unclear. Area MT+ is a likely 
candidate given that it has shown to be critically involved in low-level motion perception 
(Beauchamp et al., 2002; Dumoulin et al., 2000), and activity in this region has shown to be 
modulated by the speed of motion (Kawakami et al., 2002; Amano, Kimura, Nishida, Takeda, & 
Gomi, 2009). It has, however, been shown that the processing of biological motion (i.e., a more 
specific type of visual motion) relies on a region anterior and superior to low-level motion area 
MT+. Simulations in comprehension of language that denotes fast vs. slow human movements 
might therefore rely more strongly on posterior regions of the STS that have similarly shown to be 
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sensitive to speed in biological motion perception (Giese & Lappe, 2002; Jacobs, Pinto, & Shiffrar, 
2004). It might, however, be a possibility that speed in biological motion perception is not 
processed within the posterior STS directly, but relies on low-level signals from motion-sensitive 
areas (for a discussion see Beintema, Georg, & Lappe, 2006). Given that movement velocity is 
tightly associated with the amount of effort that needs to be exerted in performing an action, 
language describing fast and slow human action might similarly draw on regions involved in 
control and timing of motor movements (Guillot et al., 2009; Michelon, Vettel, & Zacks, 2006). 
In summary, there is strong evidence for a role of sensory-motor brain areas in 
comprehension of motion-related language, while the exact nature of and information recruited in 
these language-induced simulations is a topic that needs further investigation. Whether sensory-
motor simulations during the processing of motion-related language include information about the 
“speed of motion” and through which neural mechanisms is a question that is addressed here. In the 
current study, we asked whether motion speed, implied in action sentences, affects representations 
of sentence meaning by directly testing whether activity in motor and motion processing regions is 
modulated by whether a linguistic phrase implies a slow or fast movement. We measured changes 
in the hemodynamic response of participants while they read sentences that either described 
relatively slow or fast actions. First, if mental simulations during language processing incorporate 
the exact motion dynamics of the motor experiences on which they are based, then, slow and fast 
action sentences might differentially recruit regions that have shown to play a role in motion 
processing, specifically within the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and motion perception 
area MT+ (Rees, Friston & Koch, 2000). As mentioned earlier, the pSTS has shown to play a role 
in the processing of biological motion (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 
2000; Grossman et al., 2000; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, & Belliveau, 2001; Beauchamp, 
Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2002). MT+ and surrounding regions are commonly found in accessing 
conceptual information about motion attributes (Kable et al., 2005; Saygin, McCullough, Alac, & 
Emmory, 2010; Rueschemeyer, Glenberg, Kaschak, Mueller, & Friederici, 2010). Second, regions 
that are involved in the execution of motor movements and representation of action plans are also 
likely to play a role in processing sentences that describe dynamic events, given that movement 
velocity is strongly linked to the amount of effort exerted in human action performance. Here, we 
examined the primary motor cortex and the anterior inferior parietal lobule. The latter region has 
been shown to be involved in the execution of complex motor movements, tool use and the 
representation of action plans (Brandi, Wohlschläger, Sorg, & Hermsdörfer, 2014; Graziano, 
Taylor, & Moore, 2002; Lewis, 2006; Rumiati et al., 2004) and is frequently found to be activated 
by action/tool semantics relative to non-action semantics (Desai et al. 2009, 2011, 2013; Noppeney, 
Josephs, Kiebel, Friston, & Price, 2005). The directionality of a potential effect of motion dynamics 
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of actions within motor regions is unclear. On the one hand, an increase in effort typically results in 
a similar increase in speed of movement. However, slower actions can also reflect greater exertion 
and greater need of control and action planning. Thus, we examined regions involved in visual 
perception of action/motion, and those involved in their execution, to examine if their activity is 




36 individuals participated in the study, all of who were right-handed and between 19 and 27 years 
of age (M = 22.42, SD = 2.02; 13 males). The data from two participants were excluded because of 
excessive motion. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of 
neurological disorders. Prior to the experiment participants were informed about the experimental 
procedures, signed informed consent forms according to a protocol sanctioned by the Institutional 




The three main experimental conditions contained 14 sentences each. They were: (1) Slow Action 
Sentences (e.g., “The professor sneaked down the corridor”; “Chris shuffled out the classroom”), 
(2) Fast Action Sentences (e.g., “The professor stormed down the corridor”; “Chris bolted out the 
classroom”), (3) Abstract Sentences (e.g., “John deceived all of his friends”; “Sophie admired her 
old history teacher”). Only the main verb differed between Fast and Slow action sentences. The 
fast, slow, and abstract verbs were rated for motion speed (see below). Additionally, false font 
sentences were also presented, which we do not use here.  
 The sentences of all experimental conditions were matched on a number of psycholinguistic 
variables (see Table 1). A three-way ANOVA ensured that all the main verbs used in these 
sentences were matched on number of letters, number of phonemes and number of syllables (all ps 
> 0.05). We used the English Lexicon Project Database (Balota et al., 2007) to ensure that all words 
were matched on log frequency, lexical decision RT, lexical decision accuracy and naming RT (all 
ps > 0.05). In addition, seven participants, who did not participate in the imaging experiment, rated 
the speed implied by a verb on a scale of 1 (word denotes slow speed) to 7 (word denotes a fast 
speed), with the possibility of indicating ‘no speed’ (coded as 0) as well: Abstract sentences (M = 
0.41, SD = 0.69); Slow Action sentences (M = 2.61, SD = 0.44) and Fast Action sentences (M = 
5.32, SD = 0.90). Paired-sample t-tests showed that Slow Action sentences had higher speed ratings 
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than Abstract sentences and Fast Action sentences had higher speed ratings than Slow Action 
sentences (all ps < 0.001).  
 
= = = = = insert Table 1 about here = = = = = 
 
Procedure 
Two blocks were presented for each experimental condition, each block lasting 16 seconds, 
separated by 16 seconds of rest. Each block consisted of the presentation of seven sentences 
belonging either to the abstract, slow action, fast action condition. Block order was randomized 
individually for each participant. Each sentence in the block was presented in its entirety, in a white 
Arial font on a black background, for 2250 msec. Participants were instructed to read all sentences 
without making any responses, avoiding motor execution after every trial. 
 Additionally, a motor localizer task was included. Here, subjects performed a sequence of 
movements (make fist, open hand, touch pinkie and thumb) with either the right hand, left hand, or 
rested, in blocks of 16 seconds. Two blocks each for the left and right hand were included. 
Instructions ‘R’, ‘L’, were displayed for 2 sec before each motor block, ‘rest’ before each resting 
block, and ‘read’ before sentence blocks. 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Functional images were acquired on a Siemens TRIO 3.0 T MRI system (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany) equipped with a 12-channel head coil. BOLD-sensitive functional images were acquired 
using a single-shot gradient EPI sequence (echo time = 34 msec, repetition time = 1200 msec, 36 
axial slices in ascending order, slice gap = 0.60 mm, field of view = 212 mm, flip angle = 65 
degrees, voxel size  = 3.3 × 3.3 × 3.6 mm3). High-resolution anatomical images were acquired using 
an MPRAGE sequence (echo time = 4.15 msec, voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm3, 192 sagittal slices, 
field of view = 256). 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed with the AFNI software package (Cox, 1996). A 
standardized preprocessing pipeline involved registration to the anatomy (Saad et al., 2009), co-
registration (Cox & Jesmanowicz, 1999), and projection into standard stereotaxic space (Talairach 
and Tournoux, 1988). An isotropic Gaussian kernel with 6-mm FWHM was applied to the 
normalized images, and they were converted to percent signal change. The ensuing preprocessed 
fMRI time series were analyzed on a subject-by-subject basis using an event-related approach in the 
context of voxel-wise multiple linear regression with regressors for each condition (Fast Action, 
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Slow Action, Abstract, False Font) convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. 
Six motion parameters, the signal extracted from the ventricles, and a regressor coding the 
instructions before each block were included as covariates of no interest. General linear tests were 
conducted to obtain the effects of concreteness and speed. While the main contrast of interest was 
fast vs. slow motion we also examined each sentence type compared to abstract sentences. 
 In a random effects analysis, group maps were created by comparing activations against a 
constant value of 0. The group maps were thresholded at voxelwise p < 0.01 and corrected for 
multiple comparisons to achieve a mapwise corrected p < 0.05. We used 3dFWHMx to calculate the 
autocorrelation function (ACF) parameters for each individual subject. Subsequently, the median of 
all subjects was used in running the 3dClustSim program with 10000 iterations (see Cox, Reynolds, 
& Taylor, 2016). The cluster threshold was determined through Monte Carlo simulations that 
estimate the chance probability of spatially contiguous voxels exceeding the voxelwise p threshold. 
The analysis was restricted to a mask that excluded areas outside the brain, as well as deep white 
matter areas and the ventricles. This mask is based on the probabilistic Desikan-Killiany atlas that 
contains 35 cortical areas in each hemisphere (Desikan et al., 2006), and the subcortical parcellation 
provided by FreeSurfer. The mask was created using TT_desai_dkpmaps atlas provided with AFNI.  
 
Regions of Interest 
We defined several regions of interest (ROIs) that have shown to be involved in visual-
motion-related and motor processing, in order to obtain greater sensitivity in these regions. Given 
its association with motion processing, we defined a bilateral ROI in motion area MT+, using the 
mean coordinates provided by Saygin and colleagues (2010). These coordinates were [left MT+: x = 
-44, y = -72, z = 5] and [right MT+: x = 43, y = -69, z = 3].  
Another area central to biological motion perception is posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(pSTS) (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Grossman et al., 2000; Grosbras, Beaton, & Eickhoff, 
2012; Peuskens, Vanrie, Verfaille, & Orban, 2005; Beauchamp et al., 2003). We defined a bilateral 
ROI within the pSTS on the basis of the Beauchamp et al. (2003) study that investigated neural 
responses to complex visual motion. Coordinates for the contrast of humans performing whole-
body motions versus characteristic natural motion of manipulable objects were used (left pSTS: x = 
-39, y = -59, z = 15; right pSTS: x = 47, y = -56, z = 15).  
The primary motor cortex ROI was defined for each participant individually, on the basis of 
left minus right hand contrast in the motor localizer task. The left motor cortex was defined by the 
right > left hand contrast (average left M1: x = -28, y = -25, z = 47), and similarly the right motor 
cortex by the left > right contrast (average right M1: x = 32, y = -25, z = 53).  
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Lastly, a ROI was defined in the anterior inferior parietal lobule, a higher-order motor area 
that has been shown to play a role in hand-object interactions and tool use, and is frequently found 
in studies of action/tool semantics. The coordinates were taken from a study by Desai and 
colleagues (2009), from the action > abstract sentence contrast (left aIPL: x = -57, y = -32, z = 32; 
right aIPL: x = 57, y = -32, z = 32). Spheres of 5 mm in radius were defined around each of these 
coordinates and parameter estimates for both the Fast and Slow action sentences were extracted 
from all voxels in the ROI. The mean parameter estimates for the ROIs were entered as dependent 
variables in a two-tailed paired sample t-test across the group.  
 
Results 
The activation maps for the different contrasts are shown in Figure 1. Cluster information, strength 
and location of peak activations are reported in Table 2.  
 
Action (Fast + Slow) - Abstract 
The whole brain analysis revealed that areas activated to a greater extent by Action sentences 
relative to Abstract sentences included the bilateral middle frontal gyri (MFG), bilateral angular 
gyri (AnG), bilateral inferior frontal gyri (IFG: pars triangularis), and the left superior frontal gyrus 
(SFG), as well as precuneus. The Abstract sentences relative to the Action sentences led to stronger 
activation in the bilateral superior temporal sulci (STS), right MFG and middle occipital gyrus 
(MOG), as well as the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and occipital gyrus/sulcus (Fig. 1A; Table 
2). 
 
Fast Action – Abstract 
Fast Action sentences elicited greater levels of activation than Abstract sentences within the 
bilateral MFG, bilateral AnG, bilateral precuneus, left IFG (pars orbitalis) and SFG. The Abstract 
sentences elicited greater levels of activation than Fast Action sentences within the left MTG/STG 
and STS, as well as the right MFG (Fig. 1B; Table 2). 
 
Slow Action – Abstract 
Slow Action sentences elicited greater levels of activation than Abstract sentences within the left 
MFG, AnG and insula. The Abstract sentences relative to the Slow Action sentences led to stronger 
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Fast Action – Slow Action 
Fast Action sentences elicited greater levels of activation than Slow Action sentences within the 
right Angular gyrus and pSTS (extending into SOG/MOG). No areas showed stronger activation for 
Slow Action sentences than Fast Action sentences (Fig. 1D; Table 2). 
 
= = = = Insert Figure 1 about here = = = = 
 
= = = = Insert Table 2 about here = = = = 
 
ROI Analysis 
In the right M1, slow action sentences elicited more activation than fast action sentences, t(1,33) = 
2.56, p < 0.02. No difference was obtained between slow and fast action sentences within the left 
M1, t(1,33) = 0.48, p > 0.50. In the right aIPL, slow action sentences elicited more activation than 
fast action sentences, t(1,33) = 2.83, p < 0.01. In the left aIPL we obtained a marginally significant 
result, with slow action sentences eliciting stronger activation than fast action sentences, t(1,33) = 
1.75, p = 0.09. No difference was obtained between fast and slow action sentences within either the 
right or left MT+, all ps > 0.50. In the right pSTS, fast action sentences elicited more activation than 
slow action sentences, t(1,33) = 2.16, p < 0.05. No difference was obtained between fast and slow 
action sentences within the left pSTS, t(1,33) = 1.08, p > 0.25.  
 
= = = = Insert Figure 2 about here = = = = 
  
Discussion 
The current experiment explored the differences in sensory-motor activation for sentences that 
describe fast versus slow motion.  
 Fast sentences elicited greater levels of activation than slow action sentences in the right 
pSTS both at the whole brain level and in the region of interest analysis. The pSTS has been shown 
to play a role in the perception of bodies and body movements (Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 2000; 
Grossman et al., 2000; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; Vaina et al., 2001; 
Beauchamp et al., 2002). Humphreys and colleagues (2013) showed that processing of motion 
versus static sentences elicited activation in the pSTS, which specifically overlapped with the 
contrast of human motion > human static (and not object motion > object static), corroborating the 
idea that this region is sensitive to biological motion. Patients with damage to the STS show 
impairments in biological motion recognition despite intact form and motion processing (Vaina & 
Gross, 2004). Similarly, disruption of pSTS activity by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
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impairs the perception of biological motion (Grossman, Batelli, & Pascual-Leone, 2005). 
Furthermore, activity in the pSTS seems to be modulated by the configuration of the stimulus. 
Grossman and Blake (2002) obtained stronger activation for point-light walkers than for spatially 
scrambled walkers. Similarly, Grossman and Blake (2001) obtained stronger neural activity within 
the pSTS for canonical (upright) point-light walkers as compared with inverted (upside-down) 
point-light walkers. Several studies have shown that speed of motion is a crucial factor that 
influences biological motion perception. For example, gait speed influences gender recognition 
(Barclay, Cutting, & Kozlowski, 1978), subjects are able to indicate which speeds appear natural 
(Giese & Lappe, 2002) and identity discrimination is hampered by unnatural low gait speed 
(Jacobs, Pinto, & Shiffrar, 2004). Disturbing the phase relations between points in point-light 
displays also impairs biological motion perception (Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994). These findings 
provide evidence for a role of global motion and speed of motion information in processing 
biological motion. It remains unclear whether global motion and speed of motion is processed 
directly within the STS or relies on input from motion-sensitive areas. Surprisingly, there is no 
direct evidence that the processing of speed in biological motion perception depends on low-level 
signals from motion areas (for a discussion see Beintema, Georg, & Lappe, 2006). Furthermore, 
inactivation or damage to motion processing area MT does not seem to interfere with biological 
motion perception (Vaina, Lemay, Bienfang, Choi, & Nakayama, 1990; Grossman et al., 2005). 
These findings suggest that besides stimulus configuration, global motion and orientation 
information, the STS itself might process speed information.  
Stronger activation for fast action than for slow action sentences at the whole brain level 
within the right pSTS extended into the right SOG/MOG. Fast action sentences as compared to 
abstract sentences also led to a similar pattern of activation as slow action sentences, with additional 
activation in the left precuneus. Both the superior/middle occipital regions and precuneus play a 
role in visual imagery of movements, whereas kinesthetic imagery of the same movements activates 
motor-related brain regions (Guillot et al., 2009). Desai and colleagues (2009) observed activation 
of the SOG/MOG for sentences with visual verbs (You see the rope) compared with sentences with 
abstract verbs (They consider the risk), providing evidence for it’s association with visual semantics 
and visually guided actions.  
Interestingly, the reverse effect was observed for our ROI analyses within fronto-parietal 
action regions. Slow action sentences elicited greater levels of activation than fast action sentences 
in the right primary motor area (M1) and anterior inferior parietal lobule (aIPL). The inferior 
parietal lobule is part of a cortical network involved in the use of tools, performance of complex 
hand-object interactions and representation of action plans and goals (Lewis, 2006; Rumiati et al., 
2004; Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Ramayya, Glasser, & Rilling, 2010). Damage to aIPL is 
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associated with ideomotor apraxia. This neurological disorder is characterized by impairments in 
skilled motor performance, difficulty in selecting and carrying out the appropriate action in 
response to a given object and impairments in imitating gestures (Heilman, Rothi, & Valenstein, 
1982; Heilman & Rothi, 1993; Jax, Buxbaum, & Moll, 2006; Haaland, Harrington, & Knight, 
2000). The primary motor cortex (M1) is crucial for the execution of motor movements (Graziano, 
Taylor, & Moore, 2002) and has shown to be activated by linguistic descriptions of actions in some 
contexts (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005; Hauk et al., 2004; de Lafuente & 
Romo, 2004; Cacciari et al., 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2006). Furthermore, slow action sentences as 
compared to abstract sentences led to a similar pattern of activation as fast action sentences, with 
additional activation in the left insula. While the insula is associated with a wide variety of 
functions, a recent meta-analysis found that a posterior-dorsal region within the insula is especially 
associated with somatosensory and sensorimotor tasks, and is functionally connected to the bilateral 
motor cortex (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013). These findings suggest that conceptual 
representations of slow actions are grounded through a cortical network involved in the 
representation of actions and action plans. In the present study, differential recruitment of motor 
regions in the comprehension of linguistic descriptions of movements at different speeds could 
reflect the fact that movement velocity bears an intimate relationship with the amount of effort that 
needs to be exerted in performing an action. On the one hand, an increase in effort typically results 
in a similar increase in speed of movement. However, slower actions can also reflect greater 
exertion and greater need of control and action planning. For example, moving a piece of heavy 
furniture is slow, effortful, and deliberate, while moving a relatively light object such as a pen is 
faster and less effortful. Thus, we suggest that representations of slower actions reflect their 
association with greater implied physical effort and therefore more strongly draw on motor 
simulation processes related to the control and actual timing of movements (Guillot et al., 2009; 
Michelon, Vettel, & Zacks, 2006). Sentences denoting faster actions, on the other hand, more 
strongly activated superior and middle occipital regions, which suggests a role for visually based 
simulation processes in their representation. An additional possibility is that the mental simulation 
of a slow action takes more time to unfold and therefore affords a greater opportunity for motoric 
processes to be involved. Fast action simulations are more rapid, and this faster time course only 
allows for perceptual grounding. 
 The current study was not designed to test effects of concreteness, and such effects been 
described in a number of previous reports. Here, abstract and concrete sentences differed in syntax. 
Concrete sentences included spatial prepositions (e.g, towards, through, along) while the abstract 
sentences did not. Additionally, there was a repetition effect for concrete sentences, given that fast 
and slow sentences were identical with the exception of the verb, which was not the case for 
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abstract sentences. While they contained abstract verbs, the agents in the abstract sentences were 
animate, and likely invoke motion/action associations. Because of these differences, we interpret 
concreteness effects here with caution. Concrete sentences elicited greater levels of activation in the 
bilateral IPL extending in to the intraparietal sulcus, the bilateral MFG and IFG (pars triangularis), 
left SFG and precuneus. The IPL plays a role in the performance of complex hand-object 
interactions, tool use and the representation of action plans and goals as noted above.  
Abstract sentences elicited greater levels of activation than concrete sentences within lateral 
temporal regions, which suggests context dependent, conceptual association-based processing, and 
is consistent with a number of previous studies (Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin, & 
Barsalou, 2013; Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Desai 2009, 2011; Wang, 
Conder, Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010).  
In the present study, no difference was observed between fast and slow action sentences 
within motion area MT+. In humans it has been shown that, MT+ shows stronger 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to higher speeds (Kawakami et al., 2002; Amano, 
Kimura, Nishida, Takeda, & Gomi, 2009). Damage to area MT seems to lead to impairments in 
low-level motion integration tasks but not in biological motion processing (Vaina et al., 1990). 
Similarly, other studies have shown that inactivation of area MT does not interfere with biological 
motion perception (Grossman et al., 2005). Several studies have shown involvement of MT+ in the 
processing of linguistic descriptions of motions. For example, Saygin and colleagues (2010) 
showed an involvement of motion-sensitive visual areas (MT+) in the processing of motion (The 
wild horse crossed the barren field) and fictive motion sentences (The hiking trial crossed the 
barren field), but not for static sentences (The black horse stood in the barren field). In a similar 
vein, Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) observed that language modulated activity in area MT+. Other 
studies, however, have failed to obtain activity within MT+ for linguistic descriptions of human and 
object motions (Humphreys et al., 2013; Wallentin, Lund, Ostergaard, Ostergaard, & Roepstorff, 
2005). Our finding can be grouped with these latter studies that did not find a modulation of motion 
area MT+ by the speed conveyed in motion sentences. One could argue that such a null effect is in 
line with the interpretation that the representations that are accessed during comprehension of 
language that denotes fast and slow motions, may not rely on information stored in low-level visual 
motion areas (Humphreys et al., 2013). However, this interpretation should be taken with a grain of 
salt, given that sensitivity to MT+ activations was likely reduced in the current study (as well as 
several other studies) due to the use of mean coordinates and lack of individual localization. MT+ 
varies considerably across individuals (Humphreys et al., 2013), and this inter-subject variability 
might create biases in group-level analyses in standard space (Dumoulin et al., 2000). Studies that 
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have shown positive results in MT+ (Saygin et al., 2010; Rueschemeyer et al., 2010) have typically 
used a MT+ localizer task to obtain greater sensitivity. 
The significant differences between fast and slow sentences were found only in the RH. This 
is somewhat surprising, given that LH is most closely associated with lexical/sentential semantics. 
However, a number of findings have pointed towards a unique contribution of the RH to language 
comprehension (Jung-Beeman, 2005). According to one view, the LH activates the dominant 
meaning or the few most salient or coarse features, whereas the RH activates more distantly related 
or fine-grained features (Faust & Chiarello, 1998; Titone, 1998; Faust, Ben-Artzi & Harel, 2008). 
Verbs in the fast and slow action condition can be thought of as being comprised of multiple 
features that are more or less central to the concept. For motion verbs, motion itself and associated 
changing of spatial position may be more central to the meaning. It might be the case that this more 
basic information is processed by the LH, and that we therefore did not find a difference between 
fast and slow verbs within the LH. This suggests the possibility that speed of motion is a relatively 
finer-grained feature and therefore relies more strongly on the RH. 
While slow action sentences and fast action sentences differed in terms of the speed of 
motion that they denote, there might be a difference in terms of how salient the semantic attribute of 
speed-of-motion is for the fast and slow verbs. It could be argued that the difference observed 
between fast and slow sentences reflects the fact that speed might be a salient feature of the 
meaning of fast sentences but not for slow sentences. A post-hoc questionnaire showed that subjects 
judged speed-of-motion to be a salient feature for both the slow (“The professor sneaked down the 
corridor”) and fast sentences (“The professor stormed down the corridor”) as compared with 
sentences for which speed-of-motion wasn’t a salient feature (“The boy moved across the living 
room”). The ratings of our questionnaire showed that both for fast and slow sentences the semantic 
attribute of speed-of-motion was a salient feature of the meaning denoted by the sentence. Our 
questionnaire, however, also pointed towards a small difference in the salience of the speed-of-
motion attribute between our fast and slow sentences (i.e., the salience of the speed-of-motion 
attribute was judged to be slightly higher for fast sentences than for slow sentences). It could 
therefore be argued that stronger activation for fast as compared to slow sentences within the right 
posterior STS (SOG/MOG) might partially reflect the fact that “speed-of-motion” was a slightly 
more salient feature for the fast sentences than for the slow sentences. This possibility, however, is 
not detrimental to the current findings, given that (1) stronger activation for “fast>slow” within the 
posterior STS shows that the speed-of-motion is incorporated in language-induced sensory-motor 
simulations (2) a reversal of the effect (i.e., “slow>fast”) within motor areas cannot be accounted 
for by an explanation solely in terms of the saliency of a specific semantic attribute to a given 
concept. 
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Conclusions 
 These results show that the speed of motion conveyed by a verb affects the way in which it’s 
underlying conceptual representation is grounded in sensory-motor regions. When the described 
actions are relatively fast, simulations appear to be more visual in nature, showing greater activity 
in pSTS and MOG, areas involved in visual semantics. When sentences describe slow actions, their 
grounding is more motoric in nature, resulting in greater signal in primary and higher-order motor 
areas in the RH. Thus, representations accessed during comprehension of language that denotes fast 
and slow motions seem to incorporate information about the speed of motion. The speed conveyed 
by motion verbs influences conceptual grounding, which provides us with valuable insights in the 
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Figure 1. Caret software (Van Essen et al., 2001) was used to display the maps on an inflated 
cortical surface of a representative subject, created through FreeSurfer (Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 
1999). Activations for (a) Fast+Slow-Abstract, (b) Fast-Abstract, (c) Slow-Abstract, (d) Fast-Slow 
contrasts. Red-orange colors denote positive values, blue-cyan colors denote negative values. 
Activations are projected on an inflated surface of a brain. Gyri are shown in light gray and sulci in 
dark gray. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere. F = fast action, S = slow action, A = Abstract. 
 
Figure 2. Shows the results from the ROI analysis. Red circles show the locations of the sphere of 5 
mm radius around the following voxel locations: left M1 (x = -28, y = -25, z = 47); right M1 (x = 
32, y = -25, z = 53); left aIPL (x = -57, y = -32, z = 32); right aIPL (x = 57, y = -32, z = 32); left 
pSTS (x = -39, y = -59, z = 15); right pSTS (x = 47, y = -56, z = 15); left MT+ (x = -44, y = -72, z = 
5), right MT+ (x = 43, y = -69, z = 3). Mean percent signal change relative to rest is shown for the 
fast and slow action conditions. Regions of interest are displayed on an inflated surface of a brain. 
Gyri are shown in light gray and sulci in dark gray. L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere. 
